

Message Text

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11
ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04

H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 EB-07 OMB-01 /090 W

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R 210613Z SEP 76

FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2581

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KHARTOUM 2751

AF/E FOR AMBASSADOR BREWER FROM COUNTRY TEAM

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, PINT, PFOR, PGOV SU

SUBJECT: SUDAN SINCE THE COUP ATTEMPT-IMPLICATIONS FOR US

REF: (A) KHARTOUM 2749 (B) KHARTOUM 2750

1. SUMMARY: PRESENTLY THE SUDAN IS STRONGLY PRO-AMERICAN AND AS IT HAPPENS IS ANTI-SOVIET. THE TIME IS RIPE, THEREFORE, TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION WHICH PRESUMABLY COINCIDES WITH BASIC US POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL VIS-A-VIS COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. OUR ATTITUDE SHOULD DEPEND ON OUR INTERESTS HERE, BUT WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT NOT TO LIMIT OUR VIEW TO SITUATION AS OF NOW. THE KEY TO OUR PERCEPTION OF IMPORTANCE SUDAN HAS FOR

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US IN PROJECTION OF WHAT SITUATION WILL BE AFTER

1980. COUNTRY TEAM BELIEVES THAT US INTERESTS HERE AND GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF SUDAN WILL INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY DURING 1980-1990 PERIOD. SEEN IN THIS LIGHT, PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY FOR WE MAY DECIDE THAT NOW IS PARTICULARLY FAVORABLE TIME TO ESTABLISH A POSITION AND RELATIONSHIP IN SUDAN WHICH WILL SERVE US INTERESTS WELL DURING NEXT DECADE AND LATER. END SUMMARY.

2. SINCE LAST MAY WHEN US RESUMED NORMAL RELATIONS WITH GOS, EVENTS HAVE MOVED RAPIDLY. JUNE VISIT OF NIMEIRI, AS WELL AS IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND INCREASING PUBLIC AWARENESS OF ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF SUDAN, HAVE RESULTED IN A POSITIVE MOMENTUM THAT BECAME PARTICULARLY NOTICEABLE SINCE EARLY AUGUST. AS D FAR AS WE CAN TELL, COUP ATTEMPT HAS NOT RPT NOT DIMINISHED INTEREST OF OTHERS IN SUDAN. ARABS AND EUROPEANS ARE MAKING MAJOR COMMITMENTS TO THE COUNTRY.

3. FOR ITS PART, AS REFTELS INDICATE, DESIRE TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY FROM US, IS MORE URGENT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF SUDANESE LEADERSHIP. EVEN GENERAL PUBLIC DEVELOPING RISING EXPECTATIONS OF IMPROVEMENTS IN WELFARE OF POPULACE THAT WILL RESULT AS SUDAN BEGINS TO EXPLOIT ITS ECONOMIC POTENTIAL. TO GOS, WHICH IS MORE THAN EVER DISENCHANTED AND SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET UNION, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT US MAKE SIGNIFICANT INPUT TO DEVELOPMENT EFFORT. FOR NIMEIRI US CONTRIBUTION NOT ONLY WILL HELP HIM ACHIEVE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES, BUT IT WILL ASSIST HIM POLITICALLY AS A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE FROM AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN SOURCE. AS NOTED IN REFTELS TZ RZZNEELING OF URGENCY AT TOP LEVELS GOS AND THEREFORE LEADERS ARE EAGERLY AWAITING RESPONSES TO SEVERAL PROPOSALS NOW UNDER REVIEW IN WASHINGTON, INCLUDING SOME WHICH ARE SOMEWHAT SENSITIVE.

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4. IN LIGHT PRESENT FAVORABLE POLITICAL CLIMATE HERE QUESTIONS ARISE REGARDING HOW BEST TO RESPOND TO SUDANESE REQUESTS TO ASSURE THAT US INTERESTS ARE MAXIMIZED. HOPEFULLY, WE SHALL WITNESS MODERATION ON POLITICAL ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO US IN UN AND ELSEWHERE, BUT OUR PRIMARY INTERESTS WITH SUDAN ARE LIKELY TO BE ECONOMIC. MOREOVER, ONE CANNOT HAVE TUR PICTURE OF OUR INTERESTS BY LOOKING AT PRESENT SITUATION ONLY.

SUDAN HAS GREAT ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND SIMILARLY IT
ISMZFBR POTENTIAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS WHICH WILL BE
SIGNIFICANT.

5. GENERALLY AGREED THAT SUDAN'S POTENTIAL FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL CAPABILITIES ARE VERY LARGE AND COUNTRY
SOME DAY MAY BE MAJOR FOOD EXPORTER. LESS WELL KNOWN
IS THAT COUNTRY HAS POTENTIAL TO BECOME IMPORTANT
SUPPLIER OF RAW MATERIALS INCLUDING IRON AND COPPER
AND POSSIBLY OF SUCH STRATEGIC MATERIALS AS GOLD,
URANIUM AND OIL. ALREADY SEVERAL MAJOR US FIRMS ARE
INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES IN MINERALS AREA. COUNTRY
TEAM IS OF OPINION THAT EVEN IF ALL SPECIFIC AREAS OF
POTENTIAL GROWTH DO NOT PAN OUT AND EVEN IF SUDAN
ACHIEVES ONLY PARTIAL SUCCESS, THAT AFTER 1980
THERE IS LIKELY TO BE ENOUGH GROWTH THAT SUDAN WILL
LOOM MORE IMPORTANT ECONOMICALLY THAN IS CASE TODAY.
MOREOVER, WE SUSPECT THAT AT ONE POINT ECONOMIC GROWTH
WILL ACCELERATE AND BECOME SELF-SUSTAINING. FURTHER-
MORE, IF SUDAN DOES PROVE TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT DEPOSITS
OF OIL (SEE A-91, SEPTEMBER 13, 1976) OR OF OTHER
STRATEGIC MINERALS, ITS IMPORTANCE WOULD BE EVEN
GREATER THAN ENVISAGED BASED ON ITS DEVELOPMENT AS A
MAJOR AGRICULTURAL COUNTRY.

6. IN SHORT, COUNTRY TEAM ANTICIPATES THAT SUDAN
WILL BECOME RATHER IMPORTANT COUNTRY ECONOMICALLY,
BUT IF THIS IS SO THEN AS A RESULT OF ITS SIZE AND
LOCATION, ITS OVERALL GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC
SIGNIFICANCE ALSO LIKELY TO EXPAND. IT IS LARGEST
COUNTRY IN AFRICA AND IS SITUATED MID-WAY BETWEEN
SUEZ CANAL AND BAB AL-MANDEB. IT LINKS MIDDLE EAST/
EGYPT AND HORN OF AFRICA/ETHIOPIA. IT LIES ACROSS
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RED SEA FROHLSSAUDI ARABIA. AS LARGE POOR COUNTRY
THESE FACTORS MAY NOT BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, BUT
AS SUDAN'S ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE INCREASES AND AS US
CONCERN WITH MIDDLE EASTERN AND HORN OF AFRICA
PROBLEMS CONTINUES, THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
SUDAN WILL BECOME OF GREATER RELEVANCE TO THE US.

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ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04

H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

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R 210613Z SEP 766 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 KHARTOUM 2751

7. IF IT IS TRUE THAT AFTER 1980 SUDAN WILL BE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO US AS A MARKET FOR GOODS AND SERVICES, AS A SOURCE OF FOOD AND OTHER RAW MATERIALS AND FOR STRATEGIC REASONS--AND WE THINK IT WILL--IT WOULD SEEM TO BE IN OUR INTEREST TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT FAVORABLE POLITICAL CLIMATE. OUR GOAL COULD BE TO ESTABLISH A POSITION AND RELATIONSHIPS WHICH FIVE OR TEN YEARS FROM NOW WILL PAY DIVIDENDFK SIMILARSPO THE WAY IN WHICH TRADITIONAL US INVOLVEMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS IN SAUDI ARABIA HAVE HELPED US DURING TIMES OF TURMOIL IN US-ARAB RELATIONS.

8. WE DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT US SHOULD COME BURSTING BACK TO SUDAN. HOWEVER, A MOMENTUM IS

DEVELOPING THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD RECOGNIZE. RIGHT NOW GOS PERCEIVES NEED FOR US ASSISTANCE AND IF WE

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CAN CONTINUE TO REACT POSITIVELY AND AT LEAST OCCASIONALLY WITH SPEED WE ARE LIKELY TO SECURE OUR POSITION HERE IN A MANNER WHICH WILL SERVE US WELL

LATER IN THE 1980S-1990S PERIOD WHEN IT IS LIKELY
THAT WE SHALL WANT TO BENEFIT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
FROM SUDAN'S STRONGER AND MORE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC
POSITION. WE FEEL THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO REGISTER
THESE VIEWS DURING AMBASSADOR'S CONSULTATION AND AS

USG AGENCIES, PARTICULARLY AID, BEGIN TO FOCUS ON
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW IN WASHINGTON.
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